Dunearn House: What 210 Buyers Actually Chose, And What They Left On The Table

1. Dunearn House At A Glance

Dunearn House is a 380-unit, 99-year leasehold condominium at 760 to 770 Dunearn Road in District 11, built by CSC Land Group, Sekisui House and Frasers Property. URA awarded the site on 3 July 2025 for $491,454,208, or $1,410 per square foot per plot ratio. It sold 210 units at an average of $3,125 psf, and it is the first private housing project inside Bukit Timah Turf City.

2. Where Exactly Is Dunearn House?

On the near edge of a 176-hectare building site.

The address is Dunearn Road, in the Bukit Timah planning area, inside District 11.

Behind it sits the former Bukit Timah Turf City, Singapore's second racecourse from 1933 until the Turf Club moved to Kranji in 1999.

In front of it, across Dunearn Road, is Bukit Timah Road and the established Sixth Avenue stretch.

The practical location is good today and does not depend on anything being built.

Sixth Avenue station on the Downtown Line is about 0.46km away, roughly seven minutes on foot.

King Albert Park is a second Downtown Line option at about 1.08km.

Nanyang Girls' High School is about 1.07km, Methodist Girls' School (Secondary) about 1.09km and National Junior College about 1.26km.

What is thinner is everyday convenience.

The nearest mall in the dataset, KAP, is about 1.59km. Jelita is about 1.93km. Bukit Timah Market, the nearest hawker centre, is about 1.98km and currently under construction.

Those are straight-line distances from the site centroid, taken from the Dunearn House location and amenities map on PropertyInsider.sg, the research platform I founded. They rank what is close. They are not journey times.

So the honest summary is a strong rail address with a weak walkable high street.

That gap is exactly what Turf City is meant to fill, on a timescale I come back to in section 11.

Five blocks, two of them nineteen storeys. At a plot ratio of 2.4 this is a mid-rise project, not the low-density estate some of the marketing suggests. Artist's impression, Frasers Property, Sekisui House and CSC Land.

3. What Did Buyers Actually Pay?

Less than the prime average, and more than the entry headline suggests.

The developer's price list runs from $1,475,000 to $4,653,000, or $2,799 to $3,382 psf.

Across the 210 units sold, the project average lands at $3,125 psf.

That is below the $3,264 psf median across the 19 prime-centre projects currently selling in the PropertyInsider dataset.

Its three-bedroom average of $3,131 psf sits almost exactly on the prime three-bedroom median of $3,130.

So this is not a premium-priced project for where it is.

It is priced in the middle of its own market.

Here is what that looked like at the counter.

Note what the entry price does and does not buy.

$1.48m is a real number, and it belongs to a 527 sq ft two-bedroom.

The smallest three-bedroom starts at 872 sq ft and $2.60m.

So the gap between the marketing entry price and a family home here is roughly $1.1 million.

That is not a criticism of the pricing. It is a warning about which number to plan around.

4. Which Layouts Sold, And Which Did Not?

Almost the opposite of what you would guess.

The price list splits into ten layouts. Subtract the published availability from the unit count and you get units sold per layout, and those ten figures add to 210.

Read the last column downward.

Grouped by bedroom count, the three bands separate cleanly.

Three-bedroom formats sold 81 of 96, or 84.4%.

Two-bedroom formats sold 88 of 176, exactly half.

Four-bedroom formats sold 41 of 108, or 38%.

Three-bedroom stock is a quarter of the project and under a tenth of what is left unsold.

The site plan colour-codes every block segment by layout, which is how you find where the sold-out three-bedroom stacks sit and what is left beside them. Artist's impression, Frasers Property, Sekisui House and CSC Land.

5. Why Did The Cheapest Unit Sell Worst?

Because nobody was shopping on price alone.

The 527 sq ft two-bedroom is the cheapest home in the project at $1,475,000, and it cleared 30%, the second-weakest result on the list.

Two layouts up, the two-bedroom plus study starts at $1,899,000.

That is $424,000 more, and it cleared 76%.

Same bedroom count. Same building. Better take-up at a much bigger cheque.

The size ladder inside the two-bedroom band explains it. 527 sq ft is compact. 614 sq ft buys 87 more square feet and clearance improves to 40%. 657 to 678 sq ft adds a usable third room and clearance jumps to 76%.

Buyers climbed as far as the layout kept improving, then stopped.

Now the other end, which is sharper.

The 1,184 sq ft four-bedroom starts at $3,588,000 and cleared 83%.

The 1,302 sq ft four-bedroom premium starts at $4,037,000 and cleared 17%.

That is a 66-point collapse for a step of $449,000.

On a per-square-foot basis the two are nearly identical at entry, $3,030 against $3,091, a difference of 2%.

So buyers were not rejecting the premium layout on psf. They were rejecting it for crossing a total-price line.

Add it up and 156 of the 210 sales, or 74%, landed in layouts entering between $1.899m and $3.588m.

Only 11 units, 5.2% of sales, went to layouts entering above $4 million, though those layouts are 19% of the project.

Two consequences follow, and they point in opposite directions.

Whoever bought a three-bedroom here will be selling into scarcity within their own development in 2030, because only 15 unsold units are three-bedrooms.

Whoever bought a large premium four-bedroom will be competing with whatever the developer has not cleared by completion, and 61 unsold units sit in those two layouts.

Both of those are facts about the same launch.

6. Was $1,410 psf ppr Actually Cheap?

Not really, and it does not matter as much as the pitch suggests.

Start with the sum, because it reproduces cleanly.

URA's award notice records a tendered price of $491,454,208 on a maximum gross floor area of 32,381 sqm.

The seminar's headline number is correct. I have checked it against the primary document.

The framing around it is where I part company.

The pitch is that $1,410 was one of the cheaper prime-centre land bids, and that later, dearer land will drag Dunearn House's value up behind it.

Against the full comparable set, the first half of that is thin.

Against the full peer set rather than a selection, Dunearn House ranks fifth of twelve from cheapest and sits $16 psf ppr under the peer median. Source: PropertyInsider.sg land cost tracker.

Twelve comparable prime sites are tracked. Sorted from cheapest, Dunearn House is fifth.

8 Thomson Lane came in at $1,297. River Green at $1,325. W Residences Marina View at $1,379. One Marina Gardens at $1,402.

All four are cheaper.

The peer median is $1,426 psf ppr, which puts Dunearn House 1.1% below the middle of its own comparison group.

That is an ordinary land price, not a bargain.

One useful historical anchor sits alongside it. The Fourth Avenue Residences site, diagonally across the road, went for $1,540 psf ppr in December 2017. Land in this pocket is cheaper in nominal terms today than it was nine years ago, which mostly reflects higher construction costs and the 2023 floor area harmonisation rather than a discount on the location.

Here is the part the seminar gets right, and it is the part that pays.

Nine developers bid, the most for a private state land site since 2021, and the top five bids sat inside a 10% band. The winning consortium was only 4% above City Developments in second place.

Nine bidders converging on one price is not a bargain. It is a market agreeing on a valuation.

Whether that agreement pays off is decided by what happened afterwards, next door.

7. What Does The Plot Next Door Tell You?

More than the land ranking does.

On 4 May 2026, URA awarded the second Dunearn Road parcel, immediately beside this one, to Wingtai Holdings and Metro Holdings at $1,625 psf ppr.

That is 15.2% above what Dunearn House paid, on the same road, ten months later.

Apply the cost stack and the Dunearn Road Plot 2 estimate on PropertyInsider.sg puts breakeven at $2,849 psf ppr and an indicative launch range of $3,280 to $3,700 psf, against Dunearn House's transacted $3,125.

The method behind that range is published at how the launch price estimates are built, and the same 15% to 30% margin band is applied to every project on that platform rather than chosen for this one.

So a buyer at $3,125 psf today is sitting below the estimated cost of the thing that will be built on the other side of the fence.

That is the replacement-cost argument, and on these numbers it holds.

Two honest qualifications before anyone runs with it.

First, the two sites are not the same product. Plot 2 has a plot ratio of 1.4 against Dunearn House's 2.4, so it will be lower, less dense and probably positioned above rather than beside its neighbour. It also carries 1,400 sqm of shops on the first storey.

CBRE's head of Southeast Asia research attributed the 15.2% premium to the site's long frontage along a future park, its unblocked landed view and the scarcity value of that commercial component. Some of the gap is a better site, not a rising market.

Second, a dearer neighbour raises the reference price. It does not raise your valuation on its own.

A buyer in 2031 compares two finished products. If the newer one is lower-density with shops downstairs, the price gap between them may be justified rather than closed.

What the neighbour does do is remove the worst case. It is very hard for a project built on $1,625 land to undercut one built on $1,410 land.

That is downside protection. It is not upside.

Beyond Plot 2, District 11 has roughly 1,100 more homes coming through Bukit Timah Road, Peck Hay Road and The Serra Residences, the freehold Novena tower launching this month, most of them on dearer land, with estimated ranges from $3,000 to $4,130 psf. The pipeline points the same way.

8. Is The School Story What It Sounds Like?

No, and this is the correction that changes a decision.

Bukit Timah's schools are why a large share of buyers look here at all.

The seminar raised the possibility that Methodist Girls' School (Primary) might fall inside 1km once the mapping was refreshed, and noted the developer had not priced that in.

On the best estimate available, it does not.

All three primary schools sit in the 1 to 2km band, none inside 1km. Source: PropertyInsider.sg primary schools map, compiled from Ministry of Education registration outcomes.

The straight-line estimate puts Methodist Girls' School (Primary) at about 1.09km from the site centroid.

Raffles Girls' Primary School is about 1.50km. Pei Hwa Presbyterian Primary School is about 1.97km.

No MOE primary school falls within a straight-line 1km of this site.

These are estimates computed from coordinates, not MOE's official home-to-school measurement, and the band that counts is measured from the individual unit's registered postal code. Check your exact stack on the OneMap School Query tool before treating this as settled either way.

Now the consequence, because a correction without one is just point-scoring.

In the 2026 Primary 1 exercise, Methodist Girls' ran Phase 2B at 1.90 times and Phase 2C at 1.54 times, and both rounds balloted among citizens living within 1km. An address in the 1 to 2km band did not get in.

Pei Hwa Presbyterian did the same at Phase 2C, 1.23 times, balloting inside 1km.

So for those two schools, a Dunearn House address gives a family no registration advantage at all.

Here is the half of the finding that helps.

Raffles Girls' Primary School ran Phase 2C at 0.93 times in 2026.

Under one applicant per place. No ballot. Every applicant was placed.

At about 1.50km, a family with a daughter is inside the 2km band for a school that did not need to ballot at 2C in the last exercise. That is a real, checkable positive, and it is one the seminar did not make.

One more thing worth saying plainly, because it gets blurred.

Nanyang Girls' High, Methodist Girls' Secondary and National Junior College are all inside 1.3km. Secondary admission runs on PSLE results, not home distance.

Their value here is a short commute for twelve years, which is worth a great deal to a family. It is not an admissions edge, and nobody should pay for it as though it were one.

9. What Has District 11 Actually Returned?

Better than the prime centre as a whole.

Across 4,154 matched buy-and-sell pairs in District 11 from March 1995 to August 2026, the middle seller realised 4.3% a year.

That figure comes from PropertyInsider's matched resale returns dataset, built from URA caveat data, and it counts winners and losers together.

91.2% of those exits made money. 3,787 of 4,154.

The median gain when it worked was $505,000 gross, before stamp duties, legal fees, agent fees and interest.

The median loss when it did not was $119,000, across 367 exits.

Median holding period, 7.6 years.

For context, the whole Core Central Region ran at 3.7% a year across 25,198 exits, with 85.2% profitable.

District 11 has outperformed its own segment on both measures.

One honest note on the loss rate. An owner sitting on a paper loss can simply decline to sell, so the true share of purchases that went underwater is higher than the 8.8% the completed-sale record shows.

The narrower read is stronger still.

Ten District 11 projects with at least 20 matched exits each, ranked by median annualised return across every exit, profitable and not. Source: PropertyInsider.sg resale exit dashboard.

Ten completed District 11 condominiums have at least 20 matched exits each. Their median annualised returns run from 3.5% to 10.7% a year, with the middle project at 5.4%.

Park Infinia at Wee Nam leads at 10.7% a year across 453 exits, 98.2% of them profitable.

Sky@Eleven managed 9.2%. Pavilion 11 6.5%. Viva 6.2%, with all 129 exits profitable.

Even Thomson Euro-asia, the weakest of the ten, returned 3.5% a year.

Two caveats keep this honest.

Those ten averaged $1,333 psf on resale. Dunearn House transacted at $3,125. This is a record set by completed projects bought at completed-project prices, not by new launches bought at launch prices.

And the strongest performers on that list completed in 2008 to 2012, which means they were bought into the run-up that followed. Timing did some of the work.

Still, a district where the middle seller made 4.3% a year across three decades and three downturns is a location with a payment record. Not every district has one.

10. How Should You Read The Seminar's Profit Examples?

As a ceiling, not a middle.

The seminar cited two nearby leasehold projects.

Mayfair Modern, with profits of up to about $261,000 on two-bedrooms, $480,000 on three-bedrooms and $533,000 on four-bedrooms, over roughly a three to four year holding period.

Fourth Avenue Residences, with up to about $182,000 on two-bedrooms and $522,000 on three-bedrooms.

I have not independently verified those figures, and I am presenting them as the seminar's claims rather than as findings.

But the reading problem is visible without verifying a single one.

"Up to" is the best outcome in the set.

It tells you what the luckiest seller achieved. It does not tell you what the middle one did, and it does not tell you how many sold at a loss.

The matched-exit dataset answers exactly those questions for the same district, which is why section 9 leads with a median and a denominator rather than a maximum.

Do the same conversion the other way and the seminar's own examples become more useful, not less.

A $480,000 gain on a three-bedroom bought at roughly $2.4m over four years is about 4.6% a year before costs.

That is a good result. It is also close to District 11's own median of 4.3%, which means it is a normal outcome for the area rather than evidence of something special about those projects.

The claim that survives is worth stating plainly: nearby leasehold projects in this pocket have made money for their sellers.

The claim that does not survive is that the headline figures describe what a typical buyer should expect.

11. What Has Turf City Actually Committed To?

A great deal, over a very long time.

Bukit Timah Turf City covers 176 hectares and has been largely zoned for housing since URA's 1998 master plan. The interim lifestyle tenants left at the end of 2023.

URA and HDB announced in May 2024 that the site will hold 15,000 to 20,000 public and private homes, delivered over roughly 20 to 30 years.

It is planned as a car-lite estate with reduced parking provision, ten-minute neighbourhoods and two stations: Sixth Avenue on the Downtown Line, and the future Turf City station on the Cross Island Line, targeted by LTA for 2032.

Development starts at the end nearest existing transport, which is the Dunearn Road frontage.

That is where Dunearn House sits.

Read that sentence twice, because it cuts both ways and the marketing only uses one edge.

The favourable edge is real. This project gets the mature Bukit Timah surroundings that exist today, plus an estate being built behind it, plus a second rail line about two years after it completes.

The unfavourable edge is just as real. Being first at the near end of a 20 to 30 year build means living beside the works for a long time, and road improvement is already planned for Dunearn Road, Bukit Timah Road and Eng Neo Avenue.

And one more feature that deserves to be stated rather than implied.

Turf City will include HDB flats, the first new public housing in Bukit Timah in almost 40 years, sited predominantly near the two MRT stations.

The seminar frames the surrounding public housing population as a future pool of upgrader buyers, which is a fair argument.

A buyer paying $3,125 psf for a prime-centre address should also understand the other half of it. The neighbourhood being built here is a mixed public and private estate, not an exclusive private enclave, and the exclusivity premium some buyers are paying for is a feature of the present, not of 2040.

Which of those two readings matters more depends entirely on why you are buying, and I come to that in section 14.

The arrival court off Dunearn Road. The frontage is the part of Turf City that gets built first. Artist's impression, Frasers Property, Sekisui House and CSC Land.

12. What Genuinely Holds Up

Five things, and none of them are marketing.

The rail position is real today. Sixth Avenue on the Downtown Line is about 0.46km, roughly seven minutes on foot, with King Albert Park as a second option at about 1.08km. Nothing has to be built for that to be true, and the Cross Island Line interchange targeted for 2032 arrives about two years after completion rather than fifteen.

The pricing is not aggressive for its market. $3,125 psf against a $3,264 psf median across 19 selling prime-centre projects, and a three-bedroom average of $3,131 against a prime three-bedroom median of $3,130. The developer priced into the middle of the market it competes in, not above it.

The land is protected by the plot beside it. $1,410 psf ppr against $1,625 next door, awarded ten months later, with an estimated launch range of $3,280 to $3,700 psf. That does not guarantee appreciation. It does make it hard for the next project on this road to arrive cheaper.

The district has a genuine payment record. 91.2% of 4,154 completed District 11 resales made money, the middle seller taking 4.3% a year over a 7.6-year hold. That is ahead of the 3.7% and 85.2% recorded across the whole prime centre.

The three-bedroom stock is scarce inside the project itself. Two three-bedroom layouts sold out entirely and only 15 of the 170 remaining units are three-bedrooms. A three-bedroom owner here reaches 2030 with very little in-development competition, in the exact format that cleared 84.4% at launch.

Set against the five-point framework I use on every project, this scores well on location fundamentals, reasonably on developer track record, and well on unit mix for the formats that sold.

Where it gets harder is entry price against exit competition. That is section 13.

If you want the framework itself, I have written it up at what I look at when advising a buyer on a new launch, and every project I have run through it sits together on my Singapore new launch project reviews page.

The 50-metre lap pool on the main pool deck. Artist's impression, Frasers Property, Sekisui House and CSC Land.

13. What Could Go Wrong?

Four things, in the order I would worry about them.

The large formats did not clear, and they are your neighbours on exit

61 unsold units sit in the two four-bedroom premium layouts above $4 million, out of 170 remaining.

If those are still moving slowly closer to completion, the developer has levers a private seller does not: price adjustments, payment schemes, furniture packages.

A buyer who paid $4.3m in July 2026 and wants out in 2031 may be selling alongside developer stock.

That is the single clearest risk on this project, and it is concentrated in one part of the price list.

The school premium may already be priced without the school benefit

Buyers pay for Bukit Timah partly because of its schools.

On the best current estimate, no primary school is inside 1km, and the two heavily subscribed ones balloted inside 1km in 2026.

If a family bought expecting a Primary 1 advantage that does not exist, the disappointment is theirs. If the wider market gradually notices the same thing, it becomes a pricing question.

You are living on a construction frontage

Turf City is a 20 to 30 year build that starts at the Dunearn Road end, with road improvement works planned on three surrounding roads.

Plot 2 next door previews around Q3 2027 and completes around 2031.

So the first years of occupation will not be quiet, and the finished estate that appears in the renderings will not exist for decades.

The exit relies on the prime centre absorbing a lot of stock

2,193 of 6,065 units across 19 selling prime-centre projects were still unsold at the time of the launch study, an absorption rate of 63.8% against 81.5% across all 72 selling projects tracked.

District 11 alone has roughly 1,100 more homes coming, most of them on dearer land.

Dearer land supports the reference price. It also means more competing new stock arriving between now and any resale.

14. Who Is Dunearn House For?

Three groups, clearly, and two who should look elsewhere.

Two groups I would steer away.

The buyer chasing the entry quantum. $1.48m buys 527 sq ft. It also bought into the layout that cleared 30% at launch, which is the market telling you something about how it will resell.

The family buying primarily for Primary 1 registration. On current estimates the site is outside every primary school's 1km band. Verify your exact unit on OneMap first, and if the school is the reason, let the OneMap result decide rather than the brochure.

15. My View: The Argument Moved Next Door

The pitch for this project is that the land was cheap.

I do not think that is the reason to own it, and the peer table is why. Fifth of twelve, 1.1% under the median, four comparable sites cheaper. That is a normal price paid by a consortium that beat eight other bidders by 4%.

Nine developers agreeing on a valuation is not a discount. It is a consensus.

What actually changed the arithmetic happened ten months later, when the plot on the other side of the fence went for 15.2% more.

Dunearn House is not cheap land. It is the last of the cheaper land on this road.

Those are different claims and only the second one is defensible.

It matters because it changes what a buyer should expect. A cheap-land story implies a rerating. A last-of-the-cheaper-land story implies a floor.

A floor is worth having. It is worth less than a rerating, and it should be paid for accordingly.

The second thing I would say is that the launch already told you which units to want, and the market was clearer than any brochure.

Buyers with prime-centre budgets skipped the 527 sq ft entry unit, climbed the size ladder inside each band, and stopped hard at $4 million.

They bought layout. They did not buy the lowest number.

Anyone shopping the 170 units left should read that result as a forecast of who will be shopping in 2031, because the same logic will be running then.

My third point is the one I would want said to me if I were buying here.

The school argument, which is a large part of why people pay a Bukit Timah premium, does not do what buyers assume at this address.

No primary school inside 1km. The two heavily subscribed ones balloted inside 1km in 2026. The secondary schools nearby admit on PSLE results, not distance.

The genuine school benefit here is a short commute and one girls' primary at 1.50km that did not need to ballot at Phase 2C. That is worth something. It is not the twelve-year admissions solution the location's reputation implies.

So my read is a good project bought for slightly the wrong reasons.

Priced sensibly against its own market. Protected on the downside by the plot next door. Sitting in a district with a real payment record. Weakest exactly where the launch said it was weakest, in the large formats above $4 million.

If you are buying a three-bedroom to live in for a decade, most of this review is on your side.

If you are buying the cheapest unit for a quick capital story, the launch already voted against you.

16. What I Would Watch From Here

Five things, in order of how much they would change my view.

• Whether the 61 unsold four-bedroom premium units move, and at what price, over the next two quarters.
• The Dunearn Road Plot 2 price list when it previews, targeted around Q3 2027, against its $3,280 to $3,700 psf estimate.
• The 2027 Primary 1 results for Methodist Girls', Raffles Girls' Primary and Pei Hwa Presbyterian, and whether the 1km ballot cut changes.
• URA caveat data catching up, which will replace derived launch averages with transacted ones.
• Any confirmed timing on the first Turf City public housing sites and the Cross Island Line station works.

Four of those five are checkable in public data, which is the point of writing them down.

17. The Short Version

So what should you do with this?

If you are shopping the remaining 170 units, note that only 15 are three-bedrooms and 61 are premium four-bedrooms above $4 million. Those two facts point to very different resale positions in 2030.

If schools are your reason for looking, check your exact unit on the OneMap School Query tool before anything else.

And if you are weighing this against a launch on the other side of town, compare quantum for the same number of bedrooms rather than psf. This launch showed why.

18. Frequently Asked Questions

19. My Thoughts

There is a version of this review that writes itself.

First private launch in Turf City. Prime Bukit Timah address. Seven minutes to the MRT. Cheap land, dearer land next door, schools all around.

Most of that is true. One piece of it is not, and one piece is true for a different reason than the one given.

What I keep returning to is the price list, because it is the only part of this launch where several hundred people with prime-centre budgets voted with money in the same week.

They did not buy the cheapest home. They bought the third-cheapest layout in the two-bedroom band.

They did not treat $3,030 psf and $3,091 psf as different prices. They treated $3.588m and $4.037m as different worlds.

That is a real finding about how the prime centre works right now, and it will still be true when these 380 owners start selling.

A launch result tells you what the market wanted. It rarely tells you what the marketing said it wanted.

Buy the layout the launch cleared, in a district that has paid its owners for thirty years, with a dearer plot next door holding the floor.

Do not buy the school claim without checking your own postal code, and do not buy the estate in the rendering. That one takes another twenty years.

20. Sources And Update Log

Site facts and tender result. The 13,491.9 sqm site area, the 32,381 sqm maximum gross floor area, the $491,454,208 tendered price at $15,177.24 per square metre of gross floor area, the 8 April 2025 tender launch, the 26 June 2025 close, the 3 July 2025 award, the successful tenderer and the 99-year lease term come from URA's tender award notice for the Dunearn Road site. Converting URA's per-square-metre figure to $1,410 psf ppr, and the plot ratio of 2.4, are my own arithmetic and both reproduce exactly. The nine-bid field, the 4% gap to City Developments in second place and the top-five bids sitting inside a 10% band are as reported in CBRE's commentary on the tender close.

Price list, take-up and sales figures. The ten-layout price list, the per-layout availability and the resulting take-up percentages, the $1,475,000 to $4,653,000 range, the $2,799 to $3,382 psf band and the composition of the 170 unsold units come from PropertyInsider's Dunearn House launch demand study, dated 27 July 2026. The bedroom-level transacted averages, the $3,125 psf project average and the 55% sold figure come from the Dunearn House project page on PropertyInsider.sg, the Singapore property research platform I founded and publish, refreshed 15 August 2026. One inconsistency worth flagging: the land cost tracker chart reproduced in section 6 marks Dunearn House's launch price at $3,050, while the project page records a transacted average of $3,125 as at 15 August. I have used $3,125 throughout and noted the difference rather than picking silently.

Segment and comparison figures. The $3,264 psf prime-centre median across 19 selling projects, the $3,130 prime three-bedroom median, the $2,855 psf Vela Bay two-bedroom average, the 2.22 times land-to-launch multiple, the 63.8% prime absorption rate and the roughly 1,100 units in the District 11 pipeline are from the same launch demand study and PropertyInsider's tracked project dataset.

Comparable land costs. The ranking of fifth of twelve, the $1,426 peer median and the individual comparable site rates come from PropertyInsider's land cost tracker, compiled from URA land sales records. The December 2017 Fourth Avenue Residences site rate of $1,540 psf ppr is as reported in CBRE's commentary on the Dunearn Road tender.

Dunearn Road Plot 2. The $1,625 psf ppr award on 4 May 2026, the 335-unit yield, the 1,400 sqm commercial component, the plot ratio of 1.4, the $2,849 psf ppr estimated breakeven, the $3,280 to $3,700 psf estimated launch range and the Q3 2027 preview target are from the Dunearn Road Plot 2 page on PropertyInsider.sg. The attribution of the 15.2% premium to park frontage, unblocked landed views and the commercial component is CBRE's, from its commentary on that tender close. The margin band behind the estimate is documented at how the launch price estimates are built.

Resale returns. The 4,154 matched District 11 exits, the 4.3% median annualised return, the 91.2% profitable share, the $505,000 median gain, the $119,000 median loss, the 7.6-year median hold, the 3.7% Core Central Region figure across 25,198 exits and the ten-project District 11 table all come from PropertyInsider's matched resale returns dataset, built from URA caveat data covering March 1995 to August 2026.

Schools. The 1.09km, 1.50km and 1.97km distances and the 2026 Primary 1 phase ratios come from PropertyInsider's primary schools dataset, compiled from Ministry of Education registration outcomes. Registration rules and outcomes are published by the Ministry of Education. All distances here are straight-line estimates from a site centroid and are not MOE's official home-to-school measurement; use the OneMap School Query tool for that.

Turf City and rail. The 176-hectare site area, the 15,000 to 20,000 home yield, the 20 to 30 year build, the car-lite planning, the first new Bukit Timah public housing in almost 40 years, the phasing from the Dunearn Road end and the planned road improvements on Dunearn Road, Bukit Timah Road and Eng Neo Avenue are from URA and HDB's May 2024 announcement and its reporting. Cross Island Line Phase 2 and the 2032 target for the Turf City station are published by the Land Transport Authority.

Seminar material. The Mayfair Modern and Fourth Avenue Residences profit figures, the framing of $1,410 psf ppr as one of the cheaper prime bids, the suggestion that Methodist Girls' School might fall inside 1km, and the surrounding upgrader-pool argument were presented at a consumer seminar and are attributed to it throughout. They are the seminar's claims, not independently verified here, except where I have said otherwise.

My own arithmetic. The $1,410 psf ppr conversion from URA's per-square-metre figure, the plot ratio check, the 1.1% gap to the peer median, the 15.2% land-cost step to Plot 2, the $1.1 million gap between the entry two-bedroom and the smallest three-bedroom, and the annualised conversion of the seminar's $480,000 three-bedroom example.

What is still unknown. Transacted caveat averages, which had not fully lodged at the time of writing. The estimated monthly maintenance charge. Whether the unsold four-bedroom premium stock moves on price or on a payment scheme. Plot 2's approved scheme and price list. Confirmed timing for the first Turf City public housing sites. Every forward-looking figure here is an estimate and should be treated as one.

Update Log

• 3 September 2026. First published, using the price list and take-up data as at 27 July 2026 and PropertyInsider.sg's project record refreshed 15 August 2026.

This page will be updated when URA caveat data replaces the derived averages, when the remaining four-bedroom stock moves, and when Dunearn Road Plot 2 releases a price list.

Disclaimer: This article is provided for informational purposes only and should not be construed as financial advice, investment recommendation, or an offer to buy or sell property. While we have made efforts to ensure the accuracy of the information presented, market conditions, developer plans, and regulatory environments are subject to change. Property prices, launch dates, unit availability, and other details mentioned are based on current market intelligence and may be subject to revision. Prospective buyers should conduct independent research, verify all information directly with developers and relevant authorities, and consult with qualified financial and legal advisors before making any property purchase decisions. We are committed to accuracy and transparency; however, the information provided should not be regarded as an offer, statement, representation, or guarantee. While we strive to ensure the information is correct, it may not always be complete, up to date, or free from errors. Users are strongly encouraged to exercise due diligence and verify details through direct inquiries. Our agents and this website shall not be held liable for any decisions or actions taken based on the information provided here.